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SURVIVING THE "CHUBASCO"t: LIABILITY OF
CALIFORNIA BEACH COMMUNITIES FOR
NATURAL CONDITIONS OF UNIMPROVED PUBLIC
PROPERTY
In the 1961 case, Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,1 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court judicially abolished sovereign immunity. In
response to Muskopf, the state legislature passed the Tort Claims
Act of 1963. Section 831.2 of the Tort Claims Act specifically pro-
vides governmental immunity for injuries caused by natural condi-
tions of unimproved public property. For two decades California
courts were faithful to the clear legislative intent behind this im-
munity. Recently, however, California courts have circumvented
this immunity in cases in which injuries have occurred along Cali-
fornia's coast. This Comment argues for legislative intervention to
re-establish the protection that section 831.2 was meant to provide
California coastal communities.
INTRODUCTION
Each year millions of beachgoers visit California's public beaches.'
These beaches are an attractive source of public recreation primarily
t The term "chubasco," which means "windy storm" in Spanish, is used by
California surfers to describe tropical storms that develop off the coast of Baja
California, Mexico from late spring to late summer. These storms typically send large
surf to the south-facing beaches of southern California. See generally George, A Vintage
Year, SURFING MAGAZINE, July 1986, at 68, 71-77 (this article provides a good
explanation of what causes surf in California and contains numerous references to
"chubasco" as used by California surfers).
1. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
2. In 1984 California lifeguard agencies reported a total beach attendance of
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because of their natural and unimproved state.3 Although these
beaches provide a tremendous recreational resource, they present an
inevitable risk of injury to the beachgoing public. Dangers presented
by the beach environment include: wave action, rip currents, sub-
merged rocks, shifting sandbars, and dangerous marine life.4 Not
only do these natural conditions endanger the beachgoing public,
they represent a source of expanding liability for California coastal
communities.
In 1963 the California Legislature enacted the Tort Claims Act
(Act). 5 Under the Act all judicially-created public entity liability is
eliminated;6 public entity liability can be established only as pro-
vided by statute.7 Additionally, public entity liability may be ex-
pressly barred by statutory immunities. 8
Under the Act, public liability for dangerous or defective condi-
tions of public property is governed by Government Code sections
830-840.6. Section 835 prescribes the basis and requisites for public
entity liability for injuries caused by dangerous conditions of its
property. 9 Section 831.2 provides an exception to section 835 liabil-
160,700,000. Statistics on file with Huntington Beach Lifeguard Captain Bill Richard-
son. Captain Richardson is the statistician for the Western United States Lifesaving
Association.
3. See Rendak v. State, 18 Cal. App. 3d 286, 95 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1971).
4. UNITED STATES LIFESAVING ASSOCIATION, LIFESAVING AND MARINE SAFETY
9-12 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LIFESAVING AND MARINE SAFETY].
5. Cal Stats. 1963, ch. 1681, § 1, at 3266, adding CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810-
996.6. The Tort Claims Act was the California Legislature's response to the California
Supreme Court's decision to abolish government immunity from tort liability in Muskopf
v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980). Section 815 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of
an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other
person.
(b) The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with
Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by stat-
ute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available
to the public entity if it were a private person.
7. id.
8. Id.
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 835 (West 1980). Section 835 provides:
Except as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a
dangerous condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property
was in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was
proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred,
and that either:
(a) A negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity
within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or
(b) The public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condi-
tion under Section 835.2 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
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ity,1O stating: "neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable
for an injury caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public
property, including but not limited to any natural condition of any
lake, stream, bay, river, or beach."'" The official legislative commit-
tee comment to section 831.2 indicates that the immunity was in-
tended to permit recreational use of unimproved public property at
the user's risk. 2 Without such immunity, government entities would
be motivated simply to prohibit use of certain public lands to avoid
tort liability rather than incur the expenses of both precautionary
improvements and insurance.13 Recognizing the limited funding for
improving recreational public property by local municipal govern-
ments, the legislature believed it was "not unreasonable to expect
persons who voluntarily use unimproved public property in its natu-
ral condition to assume the risk of injuries arising therefrom as a
part of the price to be paid for the benefits received.' 1 4 Because most
of the beach environment's dangers are natural in origin, the legisla-
ture clearly intended to include them within the immunity of section
831.2, particularly in light of the specific inclusion of public beaches
as property covered by this section.' 5
In Gonzales v. City of San Diego,6 the court essentially removed
the immunity of section 831.2 whenever an injury occurs on a public
beach where some form of protective service, such as lifeguard ser-
vice, is provided. This interpretation of section 831.2 creates a seri-
ous dilemma for California coastal communities.
This Comment argues that the California Legislature and courts
should maintain the viability of the section 831.2 immunity. It first
examines the legislative background and policy of section 831.2. The
Comment then critically examines Gonzales and the judicial erosion
of the immunity. Finally, this Comment suggests that because the
courts have drifted away from a faithful application of the legislative
intent of the section, there is a legitimate need for a legislative
amendment to section 831.2.
10. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 (West 1980).
11. Id.
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 legislative committee comment.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Section 831.2 expressly grants absolute immunity for any injury caused by "a
natural condition" of "any ... beach". CAL GOV'T CODE § 831.2 (West 1980).
16. 130 Cal. App. 3d 882, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1982).
PUBLIC POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 831.2
Generally, the immunity provisions of the Act prevail over the sec-
tions imposing liability.17 By enacting Government Code section
831.2, the legislature clearly intended to protect public entities from
liability for injuries arising from the use of unimproved public prop-
erty in its natural condition."' This immunity was intended to be
broadly applied."9 The Act was enacted in 1963 after consideration
of recommendations by the California Law Revision Commission
(Commission).20 Section 831.2, as originally proposed by the Com-
mission, only provided a qualified immunity.21 As part of its recom-
mendations, the Commission submitted a research study on govern-
ment immunity to the legislature.2 2 A section of the study discussed
the proposed qualified immunity of section 831.2 and the level of
protection it would afford public entities.23 Discussing beach-related
liability, the study suggested that a public entity would not be liable
for failing to provide lifeguard services, but might be held liable if
lifeguards who were provided negligently performed their duties.2 4
In the final draft of section 831.2, however, the senate specifically
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 legislative committee comment.
18. See supra notes 5-15.
19. Id.
20. The California Law Revision Commission is a body composed of gubernato-
rial appointees, one state senator, and one state assembly member. Generally, when a
major revision of the law is proposed, the legislature authorizes the Law Revision Com-
mission to study the proposed reforms. Although the Commission is independent of the
legislature, the legislature controls the topics to be reviewed by the Commission. Addi-
tionally, while the legislature does not always adopt the recommendations of the Com-
mission, California courts often depend on Law Revision Commission materials for evi-
dence of legislative intent. See, e.g., Comment, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Determining Legislative Intent in California: The Need for Standardized Criteria, 12
PAC. L. J. 189, 200-01 (1980).
21. The Law Revision Commission recommendation provided:
(a) Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused
by a natural condition of any natural lake, stream, river or beach, if at the time
of the injury the person who suffered the injury was not using the property for
a purpose for which the public entity intended the property to be used.
(b) Nothing in this section exonerates a public entity or a public employee
from liability for injury proximately caused by such a condition if:
(I) the condition is a dangerous condition that would not be reasonably appar-
ent to, and would not be anticipated by, a person using the property with due
care; and
(2) the public entity or the public employee had actual knowledge of the condi-
tion a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect
against the dangerous condition.
Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity: Number 1-Tort Liability of Public
Entities and Public Employees, 4 CAL. L. REv'N COMM'N REP. 802, 852 (1963) [herein-
after cited as Recommendation].
22. A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity, CAL. L. REV'N COM,'N (Jan.
1963).
23. Id. at 494-95.
24. Id.
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rejected the two qualifications on immunity proposed by the Com-
mission.25 The two rejected qualifications would have: "(a) limited
immunity to injuries caused by natural conditions of bodies of water
and watercourses, sustained by persons using the property for pur-
poses not intended by the entity, and (b) permitted liability if natu-
ral conditions on these properties amounted to a hidden trap known
to the entity." 6 By rejecting the Commission's proposals for quali-
fied immunity, the legislature chose instead what it termed "absolute
immunity from liability.1
27
In determining the scope of "natural condition" immunity, the
legislature was concerned that the cost involved in putting recrea-
tional property in safe condition and the "expense of defending
claims for injuries, would probably cause many public entities to
close such areas to public use."28 Public entities especially might be
tempted to close beaches in light of the large surf and rough water
that make California beaches popular throughout the world for surf-
ing. 29 Few entities, public or private, would voluntarily assume the
risk of responding to claims and paying damages for the injuries that
inevitably result from such natural forces.30 As early as 1963, the
legislature was acutely aware that without immunity "the financial
stability of many public entities may be unprotected because of the
unavailability of insurance at rates they can afford to pay." 31 More-
over, even if insured, public entities would be unable to put the Pa-
cific Ocean in a safe condition for public use. These concerns moti-
25. A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE, Ap-
pendix, legislative committee comment, 638-39 n.1 (1980).
26. Id. The full text of note 1 pp. 638-39 reads:
Legislative history. As recommended by the Law Revision Commission, See
Recommendation, supra note 21, at 852, this section (a) limited immunity to
injuries caused by natural conditions of bodies of water and watercourses, sus-
tained by persons using the property for purposes not intended by the entity,
and (b) permitted liability if natural conditions on these properties amounted
to a hidden trap known to the entity. The Senate (Senate J, Feb. 26, 1963, p.
518; Mar. 12, 1963, p. 751) expanded the immunity to cover natural conditions
of "any unimproved public property," and later rejected the two qualifications
on immunity proposed by the commission (Senate J, Mar. 19, 1963, p. 903),
leaving the section in its present form.
Id.
27. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 legislative committee comment.
28. Id.
29. See P. DIXON, WHERE THE SURFERS ARE: A GUIDE TO THE WORLD'S GREAT
SURFING SPOTS (1968).
30. Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach, 34 Cal. 3d 829, 670 P.2d 1121, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 38 (1983).
31. Recommendation, supra note 21, at 809.
vated the legislature to enact section 831.2 in 1963.32
JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SECTION 831.2 PRIOR TO GONZALES
Initially, California courts were faithful to the obvious legislative
intent of section 831.2.33 In Rendak v. State, 4the First District
Court of Appeals found the State immune from liability pursuant to
section 831.2. This case involved a death caused by the collapse of a
cliff upon an unimproved portion of a state operated beach.35 The
State Parks and Recreation Department had made some improve-
ments to the beach area in Rendak. These improvements included
parking facilities, rest rooms, and campfire rings. Because none of
these improvements were in the immediate vicinity of the accident
(the improvements were all at least 650 feet away), the court held
that the site of the accident was natural and unimproved as a matter
of law.3 6 However, dicta in the Rendak opinion suggests that the
immunity may not apply in certain situations. A factual question
often may exist as to whether a naturally existing, dangerous condi-
tion is functionally assimilated into the improved area.37 Neverthe-
less, it is noteworthy that the Rendak court,
in holding that improvement of a park area does not remove the immunity
from the unimproved area, indicated that the immunity granted by the sec-
tion is to be given a broad application as it pointed out that the Legislature
in adopting the section [831.2] did not adopt the narrow one originally rec-
ommended by the Law Revision Commission (4 Cal. Law Revision Com-
mission (1963), p. 852).11
In another beach-related injury case, the court in Fuller v. State,a9
applying section 831.2, upheld a jury verdict for the City of Santa
Cruz and the State of California. In this 1975 case, a seventeen year
old youth dove from a ten to fifteen foot rock ledge into approxi-
mately three feet of water and broke his neck.40 Citing Rendak,41
the Fuller court held that the location on the beach of portable life-
32. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 831.2 legislative committee comment. See also Milligan,
34 Cal. 3d at 833, 670 P.2d at 1123-24, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (section 831.2 seeks to
eliminate "the expense of making the property safe, responding to tort actions, and pay-
ing damages").
33. See Eben v. State, 1.30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 181 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1982); County
of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 215, 152 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1979); Fuller
v. State, 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975); Osgood v. County of Shasta,
50 Cal. App. 3d 586, 123 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1975); Rendak v. State, 18 Cal. App. 3d 286,
95 Cal, Rptr, 665 (1971).
34. 18 Cal. App. 3d 286, 95 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1971).
35. Id. at 288, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 288, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
38. Fuller, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 592 (emphasis added) (dis-
cussing Rendak).
39. 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975).
40. Id. at 935, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
41. Rendak v. State, 18 Cal. App. 3d 286, 95 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1971).
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guard towers, restroom facilities, and concrete fire rings did not turn
otherwise unimproved public property into improved public prop-
erty.42 More importantly, the court stated that improvement work in
the vicinity of the beach area (for example, construction of a harbor,
jetties, etc.) that changed the sand level and water depth at the point
of the plaintiff's accident, "obviously was not the type of improve-
ment to. . .the beach that would take the area out of the immunity
provision of section 831.2."13
Section 831.2 later was applied by the court in Osgood v. County
of Shasta44 to a death occurring on a man-made lake. The decedent
was struck and killed by a motorboat while water-skiing on the
county-operated lake. The plaintiffs alleged wrongful death caused
by the dangerous, overcrowded condition resulting from the County's
promotion of the lake as a recreational area. 45 The plaintiffs also
asserted that section 831.2 did not apply because the lake, being
man-made, was not in a natural condition. In affirming the demur-
rer, the court carefully reviewed the legislative history of section
831.2 and held that the immunity was unconditional. The court fur-
ther noted that section 831.2 applied to "a natural condition of any
lake, stream, river or beach" not "a natural condition of any natural
lake, stream. . ." as the statute originally had read when first intro-
duced in 1963.8
Two months after the Fuller decision, however, the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal began to limit the application of section 831.2.
In Buchanan v. City of Newport Beach,47 the court, failing to make
reference to Fuller, held that an injured bodysurfer stated a cause of
action because the governmental entity knew that improvements to
an adjacent harbor entrance had altered "the flow of the ocean, the
wave action and the slope of the beach.1 48 The plaintiff in Buchanan
argued that the harbor entrance construction and the resulting ac-
cretion of sand on an adjacent beach changed formerly "spilling"
waves to dangerous "plunging" type waves.49 The court held that
42. Fuller, 51 Cal. App. 3d at 937, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
43. Id.
44. 50 Cal. App. 3d 586, 123 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1975).
45. Id. at 588, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
46. Id. at 589-90, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
47. 50 Cal. App. 3d 221, 123 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1975).
48. Id. at 227, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
49. Id. at 226, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 340. For a general discussion of wave classifica-
tions, see LIFESAVING AND MARINE SAFETY, supra note 4, at 29-30 (1981), which ex-
plains that:
waves are classified into three primary forms-(1) spilling waves, which are
altering the ocean flow, the wave type and the slope of the beach
created unnatural conditions. The court further stated that whether
such unnatural conditions become natural again with the passage of
time is a question of fact.50
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's motion for non-
suit had been granted improperly. The court believed that sufficient
evidence existed to suggest that the injury was not caused by a natu-
ral condition of unimproved public property. The court also noted
that once a city falls outside the absolute immunity of section 831.2,
questions of fact still remain as to whether the condition actually
was dangerous and whether the failure to warn of the danger was a
proximate cause of the injury.51
Gonzales v. City of San Diego: THE CHUBASCO STRIKES
While Buchanan slightly narrowed Government Code section
831.2, the viability of immunity for beach-related injuries was virtu-
ally dismantled in 1982 by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Gonzales v. City of San Diego.52 On June 18, 1978, Theresa Gonza-
les entered the ocean surf at Black's Beach in San Diego. No life-
guards were on duty in the area. Gonzales drowned after she was
caught in a rip current.53 Her children later sued the City of San'
Diego, claiming that it had failed to warn swimmers of the danger-
ous rip currents.54 The City demurred on the basis of section 831.2.
Unlike Buchanan,5 5 no harbors or jetties were located near the ac-
cident, and the City had made no changes affecting the surf condi-
tions. In fact, the City's only action that had any impact on safety
was providing police or lifeguard patrols.56 Contrary to the legisla-
tive intent 57 of section 831.2, the appellate court held that by volun-
formed by swells as they move over an ocean floor that ascends gradually be-
neath them, with the crest of the wave, when shallow water is reached, spilling
onto the wave face until the wave itself is engulfed by foam; (2) plunging
waves, which are formed when a swell suddenly strikes a shallow ocean bottom,
reef, or other obstacle and breaks with flying spray, both expending most of its
energy and transforming it into a spilling wave for its remaining distance to
shore; and (3) surging waves, which occur where water is deep adjacent to
shoreline cliffs, reefs, or steep beaches, with the wave[s] keeping their trochoi-
dal . . . form until they crash against the shoreline barrier.
50. Buchanan, 50 Cal. App. 3d at 227, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
51. Id. at 228, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
52. 130 Cal. App. 3d 882, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1982).
53. Although the court said that Gonzales drowned in a "dangerous riptide condi-
tion," there is technically no such condition. Gonzales was actually caught in a "rip
current." See generally LIFESAVING AND MARINE SAFETY, supra note 4, at 34-37 (ex-
plaining how rip currents are formed).
54. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 885, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
55. 50 Cal. App. 3d 221, 123 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1975).
56. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 884, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
57. The legislature considered and rejected an exception to the natural condition
immunity for injuries caused by dangerous natural conditions unknown to injured parties
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tarily providing lifeguard services at a public beach, the immunity
afforded public entities under section 831.2 is negated.
The Gonzales court substantially deviated from existing case law
to reach its holding. In no other section 831.2 case had a court
looked to the conduct of the public entity to determine whether the
immunity applied.5 8 Gonzales is particularly inconsistent with
Fuller.50 In Fuller, the beach area at the accident site was heavily
patronized, and city lifeguards had instructions to warn users about
the hazards of diving from the point.60 Additionally, the City or the
State had placed warning signs around the point in previous years,
but the signs had disappeared by the time of Fuller's injury.61 In
spite of these voluntary attempts to warn of the danger, the court
approved of the jury's application of section 831.2 immunity.
Notwithstanding earlier section 831.2 cases,62 the Gonzales court
reasoned that the combination of the natural rip current and the
City's occasional lifeguard patrols created a "hybrid dangerous con-
dition" 3 which circumvented the absolute immunity of section
831.2. The court held that a cause of action was stated because the
City negligently performed the voluntarily-provided lifeguard service
by failing to warn Gonzales of the hazardous rip current.6 4 The ap-
pellate court thereby reversed the demurrer granted by the trial
court.6 5 As a result of Gonzales, California coastal communities are
in the awkward position of substantial liability exposure for volunta-
rily providing lifeguard services. 66 This exposure discourages life-
but known to a public entity and which they failed to protect against. The legislature also
considered and rejected the voluntarily assumed duty exception to the natural condition
immunity and specifically deleted a provision which would have made the immunity un-
available when a public entity assumed a duty to make property safe by voluntarily open-
ing it to public use. Recommendation, supra note 21, at 807, 852.
58. See Eben v. State, 130 Cal. App. 3d 416, 181 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1982); County
of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 215, 152 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1979); Fuller
v. State, 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975); Osgood v. County of Shasta,
50 Cal. App. 3d 586, 123 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1975); Rendak v. State, 18 Cal. App. 3d 286,
95 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1971).
59. Fuller, 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586.
60. Id. at 936, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
61. Id.
62. See Fuller v. State, 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975); Osgood
v. County of Shasta, 50 Cal. App. 3d 586, 123 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1975); Rendak v. State,
18 Cal. App. 3d 286, 95 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1971); see also Eben v. State, 130 Cal. App. 3d
416, 181 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1982); County of Sacramento v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App.
3d 215, 152 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1979).
63. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 885, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 882, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
66. Id. at 886, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
guard protection and, therefore, is contrary to sound public policy.
Ironically, only two months before the Gonzales decision, the
court issued Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water District.67 Keyes
was injured when he struck a submerged object while diving in a
man-made reservoir. The Keyes court recognized-perhaps in the
wake of Buchanan-that the Act does not set forth a precise stan-
dard for determining just how much developmental activity is re-
quired before public property in its natural state becomes improved
property. 8 Nevertheless, the court observed that case precedent es-
tablished that rejection of the natural condition immunity requires at
least "some form of physical change in the condition of the property
at the location of the injury, which justifies the conclusion that the
public entity is responsible for reasonable risk management in that
area." 69 However, in Gonzales, the injury resulted from a naturally-
caused rip current, and there was no such "physical change in the
.. . property,"70 yet the court rejected natural condition immunity.
Gonzales noticeably ignored an important Fifth District Court of
Appeal case decided only six weeks before. That case, Eben v.
State, 1 like Osgood v. County of Shasta,"2 involved a water-skiing
accident on a man-made lake. The Eben court applied section 831.2
immunity to the State where it had undertaken the duty to warn of
dangers on certain areas of the lake, but not at the injury site. The
court held that a voluntary undertaking to provide danger warnings
in no way impedes the absolute immunity bf section 831.2.
Gonzales also disregarded the 1979 Third District Court of Ap-
peal case, County of Sacramento v. Superior Court.74 The Sacra-
mento court implied that section 831.2 applies even when a public
entity provides safety services.7 5 In Sacramento, a drowning was
caused by a snag of debris in the American River. A park ranger
had noticed the dangerous condition and reported it to his supervisor
only two days before the deceased was knocked from his raft by the
"snag." The court stated that both the snag in the river and the flow
of the water which caused the death were natural. These conditions
did not involve anything man-made or artificial and, therefore, were
within the meaning of section 831.2.76 The court described the
67. 128 Cal. App. 3d 882, 180 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1982).
68. Id. at 887, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (citing A. VAN ALSTYNE. CALIFORNIA Gov-
ERNIENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE § 3.42, at 256 (1980)).
69. Id. at 888, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (quoting A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA
GOVERNMENT TORT LIABILITY PRACTICE § 3.42, at 256 (1980)).
70. Id.
71. 130 Cal. App. 3d 416, 181 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1982).
72. 50 Cal. App. 3d 586, 123 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1975).
73. Id.
74. 89 Cal. App. 3d 215, 152 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1979).
75. Id. at 217-19, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
76. Id. at 218, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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American River in a manner which should have been applied to the
Pacific Ocean in Gonzales:
For ages its waters flowed on the very same bed upon which the snag estab-
lished itself, heavy in time of cloudburst, light in times of drought, essen-
tially the same way they flow today. This flow, and conditions incidental to
it, are no less natural since the advent of human regulation than before; and
to say otherwise would be to impose a synthetic meaning upon the uncom-
plicated and straightforward language of section 831.2.
77
Gonzales appears to have been decided incorrectly for several rea-
sons. First, Gonzales extended the plain meaning of the absolute nat-
ural condition immunity of section 831.2.8 It is important to remem-
ber not only what the legislature said in section 831.2, but also what
the legislature refused to say:79 the legislative history indicates that
the legislature specifically considered and rejected the exceptions to
the natural condition immunity presented in a Gonzales setting.80 In
denying immunity, the Gonzales court has ignored the statute as
adopted; Gonzales seems to deal with the earlier version suggested to
and rejected by the legislature.81 The holding returns to 831.2 the
very same qualifications that the legislature deliberately removed. 2
This type of policymaking adjudication violates the fundamental rule
of statutory interpretation which states: "if statutory language is
clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and the
courts should not indulge in it."' s
Second, the hybrid condition used to circumvent 831.2 immunity
in Gonzales resulted from the "combination of a natural defect
within the property and the third party conduct of" the public en-
tity.84 An analysis based on "third party conduct" is inappropriate
under the Gonzales circumstances. It is difficult to determine who
the "third party" really is in the decision. The City of San Diego
was the defendant; it should not have been labeled a third party.
Third party conduct refers to conduct of a party other than the de-
fendant against which the defendant owes a duty to protect.8 ' This
77. Id. at 220, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
78. See Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 885-89, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 75-77.
79. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
80. Id.
81. Compare Rendak v. State, 18 Cal. App. 3d 286, 287, 95 Cal. Rptr. 665, 667
(1971).
82. Id.
83. Solberg v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 182, 198, 561 P.2d 1148, 1158, 137
Cal. Rptr. 460, 470 (1977); Milligan v. City of Laguna Beach, 34 Cal.3d 829, 670 P.2d
1121, 196 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1983).
84. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 885, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
85. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965); Davidson v. City
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principle holds true in factual settings involving a dangerous condi-
tion of public property.86 In this case, there was no "third party"
conduct to cause Gonzales' death; the accident resulted from a natu-
rally-occurring rip current. If what the court actually meant was to
categorize the Pacific Ocean as a dangerous "third party," all natu-
ral conditions would be subsumed under a Gonzales analysis.
87
Third, the Gonzales rationale suffers from an even more funda-
mental weakness. The court imposes "dangerous condition" liability,
under section 835,88 for the City's failure to warn the beach user of
the "hybrid dangerous condition."'89 A component of the "hybrid
dangerous condition," however, was the City's failure to warn of the
natural rip current.90 In other words, the City's "failure to warn" is
treated not only as the basis for "dangerous condition" liability, but
also as an integral part of the dangerous condition itself. The circu-
larity of using the City's "failure to warn" in two distinct capacities
to establish liability completely emasculates natural condition
immunity.9 1
Under Gonzales, once a public entity provides any measure of pro-
tection against natural hazards of its unimproved property, it is ex-
posed to liability for any negligent failure to protect. 92 Natural con-
dition immunity becomes unavailable for beach-related injuries
where the public entity provides any type of protection service, even
seasonal or part-time.9 3 Ironically, if the City of San Diego had not
provided any safety services at Black's Beach, it would have been
absolutely immune from liability for its failure to protect.94 As
pointed out by the City of San Diego in its supplemental brief in
Gonzales:
[l]f section 831.2 were not available to public entities which furnished life-
guard services, public entities would be compelled to take either two courses
of action, both of which are contrary to the purpose and intent of section
831.2, and sound public policy. Public beaches would be compelled to either
close beaches entirely, or to withdraw all lifeguard services from public
beaches, to avoid the enormous burden and expense of putting public
of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 894, 897, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982);
Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 751, 614 P.2d 728, 734, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 70, 76 (1980); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d
334, 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976).
86. See, e.g., Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Dist., 36 Cal. 3d
799, 685 P.2d 1193, 205 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1984); Hayes v. State, 11 Cal. 3d 469, 472, 521
P.2d 855, 857, 113 Cal. Rptr. 599, 601 (1974).
87. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 885-86, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
88. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 835 (West 1980).
89. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 886, 888-89, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
90. Id. at 885, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
91. Id.
92. But see id. at 886-87, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
93. See Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 889, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 77. But see Fuller,
Cal. App. 3d at 937, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
94. See Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 885-89, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 75-77.
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beaches in a safe condition, and to avoid the inevitable expense (which
would be astronomical) of defending against claims for injuries, and of pay-
ing judgments.95
The Gonzales court declined to accept the argument that lack of
section 831.2 immunity would result in beach closures. The court
stated that liability would not "compel public entities to close such
beaches, because of the scarcity of such natural, recreational real
property and the inevitable public outcry in response to any such
attempt.""6 The legislature, however, was specifically concerned
about just such closures when it enacted section 831.2. Moreover,
the court neglected to discuss the other undesirable alternative avail-
able to public entities seeking to retain the immunity for beach acci-
dents - complete withdrawal of lifeguard services from the beach. 98
The suspect reasoning in Gonzales recently manifested itself in
Taylor v. City of Newport Beach.9 In Taylor, the plaintiff was in-
jured when he struck his head on a sandbar after a running dive
from the beach.' The injury resulted in quadraplegia. The plaintiff
argued the existence of a "hybrid condition" to circumvent section
831.2 immunity. 101 The plaintiff presented his case under section
835, arguing that the city had a duty to warn him of the likely pres-
ence of shifting submerged sandbars. 02 As in Gonzales, the City had
done nothing to alter the natural condition of the property other than
to provide lifeguard services. 03 Despite section 831.2, the trial court,
following Gonzales, disagreed with the City's assertion of immu-
nity. 04 The trial court felt it was bound to follow Gonzales and that
the dangerous condition alleged by Taylor lost its natural "charac-
terization" due to the combination of the natural defect (the sand-
bar) and Newport Beach's conduct in providing lifeguards who
95. Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 7, Gonzales v. City of San Diego, 130
Cal. App. 3d 882, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1983).
96. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 887, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
97. What information the Gonzales court based its speculation is unknown. That
the closure of beaches would be precluded by "the inevitable public outcry in response to
any such attempt" is seemingly an area of legislative, not judicial concern. See, e.g., CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 831.2 legislative committee comment.
98. Under the Gonzales holding, this option apparently would protect public enti-
ties from liability. See Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d at 884-85, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 74-75.
99. No. 35 46 23, (Orange County Super. Ct.) (Oct. 12, 1984).
100. Trial Brief for Defendant at 1, Taylor.
101. Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 4, Taylor.
102. Id. at 5.
103. Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 3, Taylor.
104. Brief for Appellant and Cross-Respondent at 7, Taylor, appeal docketed, No.
G 0002345 (4th Dist. Ct. App.).
failed to warn Taylor about the sandbar.10 5
Based on the Taylor court's pretrial decision to follow Gonzales,
the City stipulated that the section 831.2 issue would not go to the
jury. The City, however, did preserve the right to challenge the ap-
plicability of Gonzales on appeal. To determine whether the Gonza-
les issue would be relevant on appeal, the parties agreed that after
the verdict on liability was entered, the jury would be asked to deter-
mine the factual question of whether Taylor's injury was caused by a
natural condition. 10 Although the jury returned a six million dollar
verdict for Taylor on the liability issue, they specifically found that
Taylor's injury had been caused by a natural condition of unim-
proved public property. 107 Based on this factual determination, but
for Gonzales, section 831.2 would have provided immunity to the
City as a matter of law.10 8
Gonzales and Taylor present a Draconian dilemma for Califor-
nia's coastal communities. Communities may continue to provide
lifeguard services and risk "the expense of making the property safe,
responding to tort actions, and paying damages." ' 9 Alternatively,
these communities may choose to avoid this expense by closing their
beaches, or removing from them existing protection against nature's
forces.110 Closure of public beaches would be contrary to the purpose
of section 831.2.111 A lifeguard "retreat," leaving the recreational
public to protect itself from the chubasco-created surf and other nat-
ural beach dangers, would violate sound pUblic policy.1 2
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
The need for legislative intervention is clear. The California Su-
preme Court declined to grant a hearing in Gonzales; thus, it has not
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8.
108. Id.
109. Milligan, 34 Cal. 3d at 833, 670 P.2d at 1124, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
110. Grissett-Welsh, Coastal Cities Awash in Ocean Mishap Suits, L.A. Daily J.,
Dec. 31, 1984, § 2, at 1, col. I.
11. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 legislative committee comment.
112. If a purpose of imposing liability is to deter dangerous conduct, the conse-
quences of the Gonzales holding are contrary to essential tort principle. In the face of
numerous beach injury claims following the Taylor verdict, the City of Laguna Beach
openly began considering withdrawing lifeguard service from its beaches. Grissett-Welsh,
supra note 110, § 2, at 1, col. 1; Swegles, Beach Injury Suit Prompts Coastal Cities to
Appeal, San Clemente Daily Sun Post, Oct. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 5. It is noteworthy that
Laguna Beach lifeguards rescue approximately two thousand people from the surf each
year. Statistics on file with Huntington Beach Lifeguard Captain Bill Richardson. Cap-
tain Richardson is the statistician for the Western United States Lifesaving Association.
Most of those rescued are pulled from rip currents similar to that which caused the death
in Gonzales.
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yet confronted this issue."' The Fourth District Court of Appeal re-
cently granted review in Taylor."4 If the Supreme Court eventually
hears Taylor, it may use the opportunity to overrule the Gonzales
rationale; this is unlikely, however, because they refused to review
Gonzales. The inconsistency between Gonzales and earlier deci-
sions,1" 5 and the uncertainty of future judicial action, places the leg-
islature in the best position to reestablish the legislative purpose un-
derlying section 831.2 immunity.
In addition to the possibility of beach closures or a reduction in
safety services, the lack of affordable liability insurance for public
entities adds a certain urgency to the desirability of legislative inter-
vention." 6 Affordable liability insurance for public entities is no less
a consideration today as when the Act first was enacted. The high
cost of insurance jeopardizes not only public entities' ability to com-
pensate deserving claimants, but also their ability to provide essen-
tial services.117
This undesirable situation should be confronted squarely by the
legislature. The scope of the government's liability was intended to
remain exclusively with the legislature." 8 The Gonzales exception to
section 831.2 immunity is the exact type of judicially-created uncer-
tainty which the Act was designed to prevent." 9 The limits of public
entity liability should not be determined on a case-by-case basis. The
resulting uncertainty is detrimental to both public entities and to
persons injured by public entities. 20 Adding further to the uncer-
tainty of the situation is California Civil Code section 846.121 Cur-
113. Gonzales, 130 Cal. App. 3d 882, 182 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1982).
114. Swegles, supra note 112, at 1, col: $:
115. See Eben v. State, 130 Cal. App. 3d 416, 181 Cal. Rptr. 714 (1982); Keyes v.
Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 3d 882, 180 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1975); County of Sacra-
mento v. Superior Court, 89 Cal. App. 3d 215, 152 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1979); Fuller v.
State, 51 Cal. App. 3d 926, 125 Cal. Rptr. 586; Osgood v. County of Shasta (1975), 50
Cal. App. 3d 926, 123 Cal. Rptr. 442; Rendak v. State, 18 Cal. App. 3d 286, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 665 (1971).
116 . See generally Cox, Cities, Counties Brace for Lawsuits Without Insurance,
L.A. Daily J., Aug. 27, 1985, § 2, at 1; Shapiro, The Naked Cities, Newsweek, Aug. 26,
1985 at 22.
117. Id.
118. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980).
119. Id.
120. Recommendation, supra note 21, at 808-09, 811.
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West 1980). Section 846 provides:
An owner of any estate or other interest in real property, whether possessory or
non-possessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use
by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous
conditions, uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering
rently section 846 provides general landowner immunity to suits by
recreational users of land. In the 1983 case, Delta Farms Reclama-
tion District v. Superior Court,122 the state supreme court held that
the landowner immunity of section 846 does not apply to California
governmental entities. The immunity does, however, apply to recrea-
tional land owned by the federal government.
123
If the legislature effectively deals with the issue, public entities
may better plan and budget for their potential liabilities. The ability
to forecast liability risk may assist public entities in obtaining proper
and adequate insurance coverage. Further, a clearly defined scope of
liability will discourage individuals from filing unmeritorious claims,
and public entities will be discouraged from resisting those claims
with obvious merit.
124
Some legislation has been proposed, albeit unsuccessfully. In re-
sponse to the dilemma of California beach communities, an amend-
ment to section 831.2 was introduced in the senate on February 14,
1985.125 The proposed amendment provided that public property re-
mains natural and unimproved despite the performance of public ser-
vices on the property (for example, lifeguard services), "or the pres-
ence of improvements, so long as the primary cause of the condition
for such purpose, except as provided in this section.
A "recreational purpose," as used in this section, includes such activities as
fishing, hunting, camping, water sports, hiking, spelunking, sport parachuting,
riding, including animal riding, snowmobiling, and all other types of vehicular
riding, rock collecting, sightseeing, picknicking, nature study, nature contact-
ing, recreational gardening, gleaning, winter sports, and viewing or enjoying
historical, archaeological, scenic, natural, or scientific sites.
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether pos-
sessory or non-possessory, who gives permission to another for entry or use for
the above purpose upon the premise does not thereby (a) extend any assurance
that the premises are safe for such purpose, or (b) constitute the person to
whom permission has been granted the legal status of an invitee or licensee to
whom a duty of care is owed, or (c) assume responsibility for or incur liability
for any injury to person or property caused by any act of such person to whom
permission has been granted except as provided in this section.
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful
or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, struc-
ture or activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission to enter
for the above purpose was granted for a consideration other than the considera-
tion, if any, paid to said landowner by the state, or where consideration has
been received others for the same purpose; or (c) to any persons who are ex-
pressly invited rather than merely permitted to come upon the premises by the
landowner.
Nothing in this section creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury
to person or property.
(emphasis added).
122. 33 Cal. 3d 699, 660 P.2d 1168, 190 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1983).
123. Von Tagen v. United States, 557 F. Supp. 256 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (applying
section 846 to suits against the United States as a landowner).
124. Id.
125. S. Bill 433, 85-86 Sess., Feb. 14, 1985 (Bergeson).
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that caused the injury or damage was a natural force."' 126 The
amendment, however, encountered heavy opposition. Opponents were
concerned that the amendment would have broadened the section
831.2 immunity without clarifying the original legislative intent.12
7
Immunity would be available even from injury claims involving pub-
lic entity negligence or property improvement so long as such public
entity was comparatively less responsible than the natural force in
causing the injury.1
28
Although Senate Bill 433 was defeated, attempts to reintroduce
similar amendments continue.'2 9 The goal of any amendment to sec-
tion 831.2 should be carefully limited to affirming the original intent
of the section and overruling the Gonzales decision. The legislature
should state clearly that the voluntary provision of public services on
recreational property is not an improvement that circumvents natu-
ral condition immunity. 30
CONCLUSION
Substantial policy reasons justify governmental immunity for inju-
ries caused by natural conditions of unimproved public property.
Without immunity, public entities are exposed to liability for the
126. S. Bill 433 would have provided:
Section 1. Section 831.2 of the Government Code is amended to read:
831.2. Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury
caused by a natural condition of any unimproved public property, including but
not limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream, bay, river or beach.
Public property shall be considered to exist in a natural condition and in an
unimproved state notwithstanding either of the following:
(a) The past or current performance, by or on behalf of a public party, of
public services, related to the property or the use of the property.
(b) The presence of improvements, so long as the primary cause of the condi-
tion that caused the injury or damage was a natural force or a combination of
forces.
Id.
127. Letter from Robert B. Steinberg, President of the California Trial Lawyers
Association, to State Senator Marian Bergeson (Apr. 10, 1985); Telephone interview
with Ms. Julie Frolberg, Chief of Staff for State Senator Marian Bergeson (Oct. 21,
1985).
128. Letter from Robert B. Steinberg, President of the California Trial Lawyers
Association, to State Senator Marian Bergeson (Apr. 10, 1985).
129. Telephone interview with Ms. Julie Frolberg, Chief of Staff for State Senator
Marian Bergeson (Jan. 20, 1986). Following the defeat of Senate Bill 433, Senator
Bergeson introduced Senate Bill 1694, which specifically addressed the Gonzales factual
setting. The bill would have preserved section 831.2 immunity notwithstanding the provi-
sion of protective services by beach communities. S. Bill 1694, 86-87 Sess., Feb. 5, 1986
(Bergeson). This proposal was also defeated.
130. But see Gonzales v. City of San Diego, 130 Cal. App. 3d 882, 182 Cal. Rptr.
73 (1982).
multitude of natural dangers that arise in the beach environment,
including wave action, rip currents, submerged rocks, shifting sand-
bars, and dangerous marine life.1 1 Without immunity, public enti-
ties might prohibit the use of many of California's vast recreational
resources, or abandon attempts to protect the public against injury in
this environment.1
3 2
The legislature specifically intended to insulate the government
from liability by enacting section 831.2. The judiciary may eventu-
ally resolve the present dilemma of the beach cities by overruling
Gonzales. Nonetheless, the appropriate solution to the judicial modi-
fication of section 831.2 lies in a legislative amendment to the sec-
tion. This preference is founded on the potential speed, clarity, and
certainty of an appropriate legislative response.
Determinations regarding the scope of government liability have
been specifically and exclusively reserved for the legislature. 33 Such
a measure would provide reasonable protection for California's
coastal communities and, at the same time, would encourage the vol-
untary provision of lifeguard services on public beaches.
ROBERT J. GERARD, JR.
131. See generally LIFESAVING AND MARINE SAFETY, supra note 4, at 9-12
(1981).
132. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 831.2 legislative committee comment.
133. CAL, GOV'T CODE § 815 (West 1980).
